

**Universitatea Babeș–Bolyai, Cluj–Napoca**  
**Facultatea de Științe Politice, Administrative și ale Comunicării**  
**Anul universitar 2017-2018**  
**Semestrul I**

## **POLITICA COMPARATA – TEORIE SI METODA<sup>1</sup>**

### **I. Informații generale despre curs, seminar, lucrare practică sau laborator**

**Titlul disciplinei:** Politica comparată : teorie și metodă

**Codul:**

**Numărul de credite:**

**Locul de desfășurare:**

Facultatea de Științe Politice, Administrative și ale Comunicării, str. General Traian Moșoiu, nr. 71

### **II. Informații despre titularul de curs, seminar, lucrare practică sau laborator**

**Nume, titlul științific:** Dr. Daniela Angi

**Informații de contact (adresă e-mail, eventual nr. de telefon)**

### **III. Conditionari si cunostinte prerechizite**

Inscrierea la cursul de fata nu este conditionata de promovarea anumitor cursuri in prealabil. Cu toate acestea, in vederea intelegerii si a parcurgerii cu usurinta a acestui curs se recomanda parcurgerea in prealabil a urmatoarelor cursuri : Sistemul politic romanesc, Partide si sisteme de partide sau politici electorale.

### **IV. Descrierea cursului**

Acest curs introductiv în domeniul politicilor comparate își propune să îi familiarizeze pe studenți cu principalele concepte, teorii și modele de analiză în domeniu și să ofere ilustrări ale modului de utilizare al acestora. Este discutata aplicarea analizei comparative in studiul unor teme fundamentale din stiintele politice, respectiv sisteme si regimuri politice, sisteme electorale, sisteme de partide si de grupuri de interese si, nu in ultimul rand, in studiul culturii politice.

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<sup>1</sup> Acest suport de curs a fost realizat de Prof.Univ.Dr. Cosmin Marian si modificat/adaugit de Dr. Daniela Angi si Lect.Univ. Dr. Bogdan Radu.

La sfârșitul semestrului studenții trebuie să:

- înțeleagă conceptele fundamentale în compararea sistemelor politice;
- fie familiarizați cu principalele teorii și abordări ale disciplinei;
- fi asimilat principalele tehnici de analiză;
- fie capabili să realizeze un studiu comparativ.

**Concepte de baza:** metoda comparatiei, sistem politic, sistem institutional, democratie, poliarhie, autoritarism, totalitarism, sistem electoral, formula electorala, sisteme electorale majoritare, sisteme electorale proporționale, sisteme electorale mixte și semi-proporționale, cultura politica, cultura politica participativa, cultura politica dependenta, cultura politica parohiala, cultura civica, partid politic, sistem de partide, tranzitie, natiune, nationalism, multietnicitate.

## V. Organizarea temelor in cadrul cursului

Cursul este organizat in 4 module, descrise mai jos :

**Modul 1: Compararea sistemelor politice**

**Modul 2: Compararea sistemelor electorale**

**Modul 3: Compararea sistemelor de partide si a grupurilor de interese**

**Modul 4: Compararea tipurilor de cultura politica**

## VI. Formatul si tipul activitatilor implicate in curs

Studentii trebuie sa participe la cele 2 intalniri din cadrul programului de invatamant la distanta. Pentru fiecare din aceste intalniri studentii vor trebui sa realizeze cate o tema de casa relevanta pentru modulul discutat in cadrul intalnirilor. Aceste teme vor fi furnizate prin e-mail cu o saptamana inainte in data stabilita.

## VII. Materiale bibliografice obligatorii

Gabriel Almond, et. al. *Comparative Politics Today: A World View*. Longman, 2003

Rod Hague și Martin Harrop. *Comparative Government and Politics*. Ed. A 5-a. Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

Dahl, Robert A., *Poliarhiile: participare și opoziție*, Iași, Institutul European, 2000

## VIII. Materiale si instrumente necesare pentru curs

- calculatoare (PC), materiale demonstrative

## **IX. Politica de evaluare si notare**

40 % temele pe parcursul semestrului  
60 % examenul final

## **X. Elemente de deontologie academica**

Notiunea de *plagiat* se defineste în conformitate cu normele Catedrei de Stiinte Politice a Universitatii « Babes-Bolyai »:

([http://www.polito.ubbcluj.ro/polito/documente/reguli\\_plagiat.pdf](http://www.polito.ubbcluj.ro/polito/documente/reguli_plagiat.pdf))

Plagiatul si tentativa de fraudă la examen se sanctioneaza cu nota 1 la acest curs si expunerea cazului în sedinta Catedrei pentru luarea masurilor administrative corespunzatoare.

Fraudă la examenul final se pedepseste cu eliminarea de la examen.

## **XI. Studenti cu dizabilitati**

In cazul unor studenti cu dizabilitati motorii sau intelectuale pot fi contactat pe adresa de e-mail în vederea gasirii unei solutii in vederea oferirii de sanse egale acestora.

## **Modul 1. Compararea sistemelor politice**

### **Introducere : politica comparata ca subdomeniu al stiintei politice**

Materia politicilor comparate se refera la compararea diferitelor elemente ale sistemelor politice si cautarea de explicatii atat pentru diferentele cat si asemanarile existente. In stiintele sociale, informatia este mai greu de obtinut decat in cazul stiintelor naturale, si chiar si in situatiile in care aceasta este obtinuta, precizia masurarii este mult mai scazuta. De aceea, in contextul stiintelor sociale, metoda comparativa este esentiala in explicarea unor fenomene si relatii, care nu pot fi analizate direct sau prin metodele specifice pozitivismului.

Asadar, comparatia ca strategie analitica este utilizata in urmatoarele scopuri:

- pentru intelegerea in profunzime a fenomenelor si proceselor politice
- pentru evaluarea performantei institutiilor politice
- pentru crearea de categorii analitice pentru diverse fenomene si procese politice

Sectiunile urmatoare ilustreaza cateva tematici esentiale din stiinta politica, al caror studiu poate fi abordat comparativ, in vederea unei intelegeri aprofundate a diversitatii de manifestare a proceselor politice si a varietatii de consecinte pe care le pot avea diferite optiuni de design institutional.

### **Puterea politica si forme ale sistemelor politice**

Definitii ale puterii:

- Abilitatea de a obtine ce vrei, atunci cand vrei
- Potentialul de exercita propria vointa
- Capacitatea de a actiona asupra politicilor prin controlarea sau influentarea institutiilor statului

Organizarea Puterii in cadrul statelor moderne:

Trei caracteristici ale statului modern:

- Suveranitate
- Autonomie
- Legitimitate

Tipul de regim bazat pe contract social:

- Mandat Constitutional
- Asuma acceptarea tacita (legitimitate)
- Surse multiple de legitimitate

Definitia legitimitatii: dreptul de a conduce

- Acceptarea tacita a sistemului politic confera liderilor dreptul de a conduce
- Se refera la perceptia cetatenilor cu privire la regim:
  - Statul si autoritatea acestuia
  - Relatia dintre cetateni si stat
  - Natura si gradul de extindere a drepturilor politice si a libertatilor civile

Autoritate legala v. legitima – o distinctie conceptuala importanta:

- Autoritatea legala se refera la abilitatea de conduce:
  - conformitate cu “regulile jocului”
  - prevederi constitutionale / statute / legi
  - (cvasi) monopol asupra utilizarii fortei
- Autoritatea legitima se refera la dreptul de a conduce:
  - conformitate cu asteptarile populare
  - acceptarea tacita a regimului aflat in functiune
  - acceptarea tacita a politicilor in functiune

Exemplu aplicat pentru intelegerea distinctiei dintre autoritatea legala si cea legitima: contextul din Germania Nazista



- La alegerile din 1932, Partidul Nazist a fost unul dintre partidele “anti-sistem”
- Rezultatul alegerilor a fost acela ca partidele anti-democratice au castigat majoritatea voturilor
- Cand au avut oportunitatea, germanii din acea perioada au ales sa respinga democratia
- Hitler a utilizat proceduri constitutionale pentru a ajunge cancelar
- Partidul Nazist a distrus/destructurat Republica de la Weimar avand un mandat electoral in acest sens
- Au avut autoritate legala?
- Au avut autoritate legitima?
- O explicatie posibila pentru ascensiunea Partidului Nazist in Germania poate fi data de cultura politica a populatiei din acea vreme.

### Compararea Sistemelor si Regimurilor politice


<b>Platon (Republica)</b> – tipuri de guvernament in functie de tipul de persoana – ipotetic (nu face comparatii bazandu-se pe date reale)  Descrierea lui e generationala – la un moment dat copii decide ca cel mai important lucru pentru ei sunt onorurile –	<b>Aristotel (Politica)</b> – clasificarea tipurilor de constitutii in functie de numarul celor care conduc si de scopul urmarit (respectiv bunastarea unui, a catorva si a celor multi). Se bazeaza pe observatii ale regimurilor politice ale vremii  Politeia este o sinteza intre “oligarhie” si “democratie” – intre bogatie si puterea celor multi.	<b>Machiavelli (Discourses Upon the First Ten Books of Titus Livy)</b> – principiu de clasificare a regimurilor politice este: distributia puterii  Formele “bune” de regim politic se pot degrada.
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Timarhia, etc	Tipul de regim		
<b>Plato</b>		<b>Bun</b>	<b>Degradat</b>
<b>Aristocracy</b> Best ↓			
<b>Timarchy</b> Honor ↓	<b>Unul</b>	Regalitatea	Tirania
<b>Oligarchy</b> Few ↓	<b>Cativa</b>	Aristocratia	Oligarhia
<b>Democracy</b> People ↓	<b>Multi</b>	Politeia	Democratia
<b>Tyranny</b>			
			<b>Machiavelli</b>
			<b>Monarchy</b> One ↓
			<b>Tyranny</b> ↓
			<b>Aristocracy</b> Best ↓
			<b>Oligarchy</b> Few ↓
			<b>Democracy</b> People ↓
			<b>Anarchy</b> No

**Robert Dahl – Poliarhiile (1971)**



**Max Weber – Etica protestanta si spiritual capitalismului (2007, Humanitas)**



## Suportul legal al sistemelor politice

Rolul esential al constitutiilor

Constitutiile stabilesc:

- Relatia dintre stat si cetateni
  - Defineste cetatenia
  - Drepturi si libertati politice
- Relatii de putere intre institutiile statului
  - Centru-periferie
  - Executiv/legislativ
  - Judiciar
  - Birocratie
  - Armata

O intrebare importanta si doua raspunsuri contextualizate: Schimbarea constitutiei este un indicator al schimbarii regimului?

- **Da:** atunci cand relatiile fundamentale intre stat si societate sunt schimbate
  - Exemplu: South Africa, 1996
- **Nu:** atunci cand schimbarile se limiteaza la relatiile intre institutiile statului
  - Exemplu: Franta, 1958

## Gradul de centralizare al puterii: state unitare si state federale

- *State unitare:* guvern central (national); guvernul are autoritatea ultima (suprema) asupra unitatilor administrative locale
- *State federale:* combina un guvern central relativ puternic cu putere/autoritate reala si autonoma acordata autoritatilor (guvernelor) locale

Exemple:

*Statele Unite: Stat Federal*

- **Articolul 1, Sectiunea 9:** Limiteaza puterea congresului
- **Articolul 4, Sectiunea 1:** Recunoasterea puterii si autonomiei statelor in raport cu guvernul federal
- **Amendamentul 10:**

Puterile care nu sunt delegate catre Statele Unite (guvernul federal) prin Constitutie, si care nu sunt interzise prin Constitutie statelor, sunt rezervate statelor respective sau cetatenilor

- **Amendamentul 14:** Limiteaza puterea statelor de a impune restrictii asupra drepturilor individuale garantate la nivel federal

*Uzbekistan: Stat Unitar*

- **Articolul 15:**

Stipuleaza “suprematia neconditionata a Constitutiei si a statului national”

- **Articolul 78:**

Parlamentul poate aboli/suprima orice regiune la orice moment de timp

- **Articolul 102:**

“Guvernatorii regiunilor sunt numiti si demisi de catre Presedinte”

## **Institutionalizarea Functiilor Executive**

Seful statului: caracteristici principale ale functiei:

- ✓ In principal o pozitie ceremoniala
- ✓ Unele puteri (foarte) limitate
- ✓ Serveste ca simbol al unitatii nationale
- ✓ Seful guvernului
- ✓ Principala pozitie politica – stabileste agenda politica
- ✓ Adeseori este seful armatei

## **Aranjamente Executiv-Legislativ**

- Sisteme parlamentare
- Sisteme prezidentiale
- Sisteme prezidential-parlamentare/ semi-prezidentiale/ hybride

### **A. Aranjamente Parlamentare**

*Marea Britanie*

- Regina Angliei (pozitie ereditara – nu este aleasa)
- Primul Ministru (Desemnat de Regina, Parlamentul ratifica)
- Nu exista o separare a puterilor

*Italia*

- Presedinte (numit de Parlament)
- Primul Ministru (desemnat de Presedinte, Parlamentul ratifica)
- Nu exista o separare a puterilor

### **B. Aranjamente Prezidentiale**

*Statele Unite*

- Presedintele US (ales de Colegiile Electorale)
- Este simultan seful statului si seful guvernului
- Puterile sunt separate

### **C. Aranjamente Semi-Prezidentiale (Executiv Dual)**

*Franta*

- Presedintele Frantei (ales prin vot direct de catre cetateni)
- Primul Ministru (desemnat de Presedinte si ratificat de Parlament)
- Separarea puterilor depinde de rezultatele electorale



## Definirea unei Natiuni si suprapunerea intre stat si natiune

- O comunitate politica, imaginata ca fiind delimitata si suverana (Benedict Anderson, 1991, *Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso)
- Institutiile statului confera structura imaginatiilor populare
- Componente emotional/psihologice: trecut, prezent, viitor

In prezent, statele multinationale reprezinta norma. Mai jos sunt oferite cateva exemple ce reflecta situatii diferite de heterogeneitate.

- Japonia (99% Japonezi)
- Rusia (79.8% Rusi)
- Belgia
  - 58% Flamanzi
  - 31% Waloni
  - 11% Altii/mixt
- Bosnia-Herzegovina
  - 48% Bosnieci/ Musulmani
  - 37% Sarbi/ Orthodoxi
  - 14% Croati/ Catolici

## Valori politice si proceduri de luare a deciziilor

### **A. Modelul Majoritar**

- Institutiile consolideaza puterea majoritatii
  - ✓ Executiv puternic
  - ✓ Putine partide politice
  - ✓ Putine restrictii impuse societatii civile
  - ✓ Multiple puncte de acces care permit participarea politica
- Compatibil cu *clivaje transversale/cross-cutting cleavages*

*Sistemele Parlamentare* pot, in unele cazuri, promova valori majoritare

1. Legi electorale care favorizeaza competitia bi-partinica (permit formarea in mod regulat a unei coalitii de guvernare majoritare)
2. Primul ministru este independent in numirile pe care le face
3. Proceduri dificile de vot de neincredere/cenzura

UK prezinta trasaturile (1) si (2), iar Germania prezinta (1) and (3)

### **B. Modelul Consociational**

- Institutiile construite/concepute pentru impartirea puterii
  - ✓ Executiv divizat sau diminuat/reduc
  - ✓ Stimulente pentru existenta mai multor partide
  - ✓ Putine puncte de acces care sa permita participarea politica

✓ Compatibil cu *clivaje polarizate*

*Sistemele Prezidentiale* pot, in unele cazuri, promova valori consociationale

1. Legile electorale favorizeaza un sistem multi-partid
2. Prevederi speciale pentru partidele minoritare/mici
3. Executiv divizat

Bosnia-Herzegovina prezinta toate cele 3 caracteristici, pe cand Elvetia doar (1) si (3)

*Sistemele Prezidential-Parliamentare*

- Permit fluctuatii intre cele 2 seturi de valori (majoritare si consociationale). Mai jos sunt descrise situatii diferite:
  - **DACA** parlamentul este format dintr-o majoritatea a partidului care il sprijina pe presedinte avem un regim mai aproape de **majoritar**
  - **DACA** parlamentul este format dintr-o majoritatea a partidului care nu il sprijina pe presedinte avem un regim mai aproape de **consociational**
  - **Daca** nu exista majoritate in parlament atunci procesele politice particulare vor determina in fiecare situatie concreta valorile care predomina

**Arend Lijphart**, Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links  
 Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 12, No. 3.  
 (Sep., 1979), pp. 499-515.

**A CLASSIFICATION OF (CONTEMPORARY AND HISTORICAL) CONSOCIATIONS AND FEDERATIONS**

	Consociations	Semiconsociations	Nonconsociations
<b>Federations</b>	<b>I</b> Austria Malaysia Switzerland	<b>II</b> Canada India Nigeria	<b>III</b> Australia United States Venezuela West Germany
<b>Semifederations</b>	<b>IV</b> Belgium Netherlands Antilles	<b>V</b>	<b>VI</b>
<b>Unitary Regimes</b>	<b>VII</b> Cyprus Lebanon Luxembourg Netherlands Surinam	<b>VIII</b> Israel	<b>IX</b> (France UK Scandinavian countries Japan, etc.)

**Alte evidente ale conflictului intre civilizatii:**

**Jonathan Fox**, Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conflict: Islam and the West, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No. 4. (Jul., 2001), pp. 459-472.

**Table I. Ethnic Conflicts by Civilizations**



<i>Type of conflict</i>	<i>Groups involved</i>	<i>Cold War era (1945–89)</i>		<i>Post-Cold War era (1990–98)</i>	
		<i>n</i>	<i>% of all ethnic conflict*</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>% of all ethnic conflict*</i>
Civilizational conflicts	Islam versus West	13	5.6	19	6.9
	Islam versus non-West	41	17.6	49	17.8
	West versus non-Islam	20	8.6	16	5.8
	Other civilizational conflicts	15	6.4	20	7.3
	Total	89	38.2	104	37.8
Non-civilizational conflicts	Within Islam	28	12.0	38	13.8
	Within West	12	5.2	18	6.5
	Indigenous minority	39	16.7	40	14.5
	Other non-civilizational conflicts	65	27.9	75	27.3
	Total	144	61.8	171	62.2
All conflicts involving Islamic groups**		85	38.3	109	39.6
All conflicts Involving Western groups**		52	22.3	59	21.5
All ethnic conflicts		233	–	275	–

\* Percentages are rounded to the nearest tenth.

\*\* Includes conflicts involving indigenous minorities.

**R.J. Rummel**, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT AND WAR: VOL. 2: THE CONFLICT HELIX, Chapter 31 THE STATE AND POLITICAL SYSTEM

1. THE POLITICAL TRIANGLE: SYSTEMS AND FORMULAS



## Modul 2. Compararea sistemelor electorale

### Ce sunt sistemele electorale?

Definite simplu: ansamblul procedurilor si mecanismelor prin care voturile sunt transformate in mandate.

Componente: 1) **formula electorala** (matematica), 2) **structura votului** (votantii aleg liste sau candidati // un alegator alege o singura lista sau un singur candidat sau mai multi/multe), 3) **magnitudinea districtului** (cati reprezentanti pot fi alesi intr-un district electoral), 4) **pragul electoral** (numarul minim de voturi care trebuie castigat pentru a primi cel putin un mandat).

### Sisteme de vot:

1. **majoritare = sisteme uni-nominale** (magnitudinea districtului = 1)

1.1.1 cu majoritate simpla sau pluralitate simpla (first past the post sau winner-takes-all) -- Canada, India, UK, USA;

1.1.2 cu doua runde de scrutin (run off) castiga cel care in primul tur de scrutin are majoritate absoluta (50%+1) din voturi, daca nici un candidat nu ajunge la acest prag, atunci primii doi candidati cel mai bine plasati participa la un al doilea tur de scrutin, si castiga cel care obtine cele mai multe voturi (majoritate simpla) – pentru alegerea camerelor parlamentului in Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Botswana, Dominica, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Federated States of Micronesia, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, United States (except for Louisiana), Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe -- sau pentru alegerea presedintelui in Argentina, Austria, Bulgaria, Finlanda, Franta, Ghana, Portugalia, Romania, Croatia, etc.

1.1.3 votul eliminator (exhaustive ballot) castiga cel care in primul tur de scrutin are majoritate absoluta (50%+1) din voturi, daca nici un candidat nu ajunge la acest prag, atunci candidatul cu cele mai putine voturi este eliminat si se organizeaza un al doilea tur; daca nici in al doilea tur nici un candidat nu castiga o majoritate absoluta, din nou candidatul cu cele mai putine voturi este eliminat si se organizeaza un al treilea tur, si asa mai departe pana cand un candidat castiga majoritatea absoluta (exemplu : alegerea Presedintelui Parlamentului European).

1.1.4 votul preferential (instant runoff voting (IRV)) - fiecare alegator isi ordoneaza candidatii in ordinea preferintelor; castiga cel care obtine o majoritate absoluta de voturi (50%+1) – Australia (Senat), Tasmania.

## 2. Sistemele proportionale (PR) (magnitudinea districtului >1, se aleg liste de candidati

<i>Largest remainders method</i>	<i>Variants</i>	<i>Quota</i>	<i>Countries employing</i>
Award a seat to each party for every quota in its total of seats; to fill any unfilled seats, reward the largest remainders (see Table 1)	LR-Hare	$v/s$	Austria (lower), Belgium (lower), Denmark (higher), Germany (higher), Italy (higher)
	LR-Droop	$v/(s + 1)$	Greece (lower)
	LR-Imperiali	$v/(s + 2)$	Italy (lower)

<i>Highest averages method</i>	<i>Variants</i>	<i>nth divisor</i>	<i>Sequence (first five divisors)</i>	<i>Countries employing</i>
Award seats sequentially to the parties according to the 'average' each presents for the next seat. Each party's vote total is divided by the $n$ th divisor from a prescribed sequence, where $(n - 1)$ is the number of seats it has already won (see Table 2)	Imperiali	$(n + 1)/2$	1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3	Belgium (municipal elections)
	d'Hondt	$n$	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	Austria (higher), Belgium (higher), Finland, France (1986), Iceland (higher), Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland
	Modified Sainte-Laguë	$(10n - 5)/7*$	1, 2.14, 3.57, 5, 6.43	Denmark (lower), Norway, Sweden
	Sainte-Laguë	$2n - 1$	1, 3, 5, 7, 9	Denmark (higher from 1945 to 1953)
	Equal proportions	$\sqrt{n(n - 1)}$	0, 1.41, 2.45, 3.46, 4.47	USA (for allocating Representatives to states)
	Danish	$3n - 2$	1, 4, 7, 10, 13	Denmark (for awarding seats within parties)
Adams	$n - 1$	0, 1, 2, 3, 4	—	

<i>Single transferable vote method</i>	<i>Countries employing</i>
Candidates with Droop quota are elected. Unfilled seats are filled by transferring surplus votes from elected candidates and by transferring votes from low-placed candidates	Ireland, Malta

Fig. 1. Eleven seat allocation methods

Note: In many countries, different formulae are used for awarding seats at constituency level and at national/regional level, designated here by lower and higher tier respectively. \*If  $n = 1$ , then  $n$ th divisor is 1.  $v =$  votes.  $s =$  seats.

Source for last column: Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver and Peter Mair, *Representative Government in Western Europe* (New York and London: McGraw-Hill, 1992), p. 156; Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose, *The International Almanac of Electoral History*, 3rd edn (London: Macmillan, 1991).

## 3. Sistemele mixte

Comparing Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds, Paradoxes and Majorities, **Michael Gallagher**, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 22, No. 4. (Oct., 1992), pp. 469-496.

TABLE 1 *Allocation of Seats by Largest Remainder Method with the Droop Quota*

Party	Votes	Full quotas (first stage seats)			Further seats	Total seats
		Full quotas	Remainder	Further seats		
A	60,000	3	10,000	0	3	
B	28,000	1	11,333	0	1	
C	12,000	0	12,000	1	1	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100,000</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>33,333</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	

Note: There are 100,000 votes and 5 seats, so the Droop quota is  $100,000/6$ , that is, 16,667.

TABLE 2 Allocation of Seats by Sainte-Laguë Highest Average Method

Party	Votes	Votes divided by first divisor (1)	Votes divided by second divisor (3)	Votes divided by third divisor (5)	Total seats
A	60,000	60,000(1)	20,000(3)	12,000(4 =)	3
B	28,000	28,000(2)	9,333		1
C	12,000	12,000(4=)			1
Total	100,000				5

Note: The numbers in brackets after the parties' vote totals indicate the award of a seat; thus party A is awarded the first seat, party B the second, and so on, with a tie for the fourth seat.

	Threshold of exclusion – maximum vote share with which it is possible not to win a seat	Threshold of representation – minimum vote share with which it is possible to win a seat
	If $s > (p - 1)$	
Imperiali highest averages	$2/(s + 3)$	$2/(s + 2p - 1)$
D'Hondt	$1/(s + 1)$	$1/(s + p - 1)$
STV	$1/(s + 1)$	0
Modified Sainte-Laguë	$1.4/(2s - p + 2.4)$	$1.4/(2s + 1.4p - 2.4)$
Pure Sainte-Laguë	$1/(2s - p + 2)$	$1/(2s + p - 2)$
Danish	$1/(3s - 2p + 3)$	$1/(3s + p - 3)$
LR-Imperiali	$1/(s + 1)$	$3/(p(s + 2))$
LR-Droop	$1/(s + 1)$	$2/(p(s + 1))$
LR-Hare	$(p - 1)/ps$	$1/ps$

Fig. 2. Thresholds of exclusion and representation under seat allocation methods

Source for d'Hondt, pure and modified Sainte-Laguë and LR-Hare thresholds: Lijphart and Gibberd, 'Thresholds and Payoffs', p. 225.

Notes:  $p$  denotes number of parties,  $s$  number of seats.

When  $(p - 1) \geq s$ , the threshold of exclusion is  $1/(s + 1)$  for all methods except Imperiali highest averages, where it remains at  $2/(s + 3)$ .

When  $s \geq (p - 1) \geq s/2$ , the modified Sainte-Laguë threshold of exclusion is  $1.4/(1.6s - 0.2p + 1.6)$ .

Under equal proportions and Adams, winning just one vote guarantees representation, provided there are as many seats as parties. Under these conditions each has a threshold of exclusion of zero and a threshold of representation of one vote.

For STV, 'vote' refers to first preferences only. We are no longer making the assumption that all transfers remain within the party fold.

TABLE 4 Thresholds of Exclusion for Given District Magnitudes and Numbers of Competing Parties

	Imperiali highest average	D'Hondt	LR-Imperiali	LR-Droop	Mod SL	LR-Hare	Pure SL	Danish
$s=3$								
$p=3$	33.3	25.0	25.0	25.0	24.1	22.2	20.0	16.7
$p=7$	33.3	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0
$p=10$	33.3	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0
$s=7$								
$p=3$	20.0	12.5	12.5	12.5	10.4	9.5	7.7	5.6
$p=7$	20.0	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.3	12.2	11.1	10.0
$p=10$	20.0	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5
$s=14$								
$p=3$	11.8	6.7	6.7	6.7	5.1	4.8	3.7	2.6
$p=7$	11.8	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.0	6.1	4.3	3.2
$p=10$	11.8	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.4	6.4	5.0	4.0

Note:  $s$  refers to number of seats,  $p$  to number of parties.

TABLE 5 Thresholds of Representation for Given District Magnitudes and Numbers of Competing Parties


	Imperiali highest average	D'Hondt	LR-Imperiali	LR-Droop	Mod SL	LR-Hare	Pure SL	Danish
$=3$								
$p=3$	25.0	20.0	20.0	16.7	17.9	11.1	14.3	11.1
$p=7$	12.5	11.1	8.6	7.1	10.4	4.8	9.1	7.7
$p=10$	9.1	8.3	6.0	5.0	8.0	3.3	7.1	6.2
$=7$								
$p=3$	16.7	11.1	11.1	8.3	8.9	4.8	6.7	4.8
$p=7$	10.0	7.7	4.8	3.6	6.5	2.0	5.3	4.0
$p=10$	7.7	6.2	3.3	2.5	5.5	1.4	4.5	3.6
$=14$								
$p=3$	10.5	6.2	6.2	4.4	4.7	2.4	3.4	2.4
$p=7$	7.4	5.0	2.7	1.9	4.0	1.0	3.0	2.2
$p=10$	6.1	4.3	1.9	1.3	3.5	0.7	2.8	2.0

ote:  $s$  refers to number of seats,  $p$  to number of parties.

*The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945-85, Arend Lijphart The American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 2. (Jun., 1990), pp. 481-496.*

Electoral Laws

**Figure 1. Average Disproportionality and Average Number of Elective Parties of Electoral Systems in Change, 1945-85**



Impactul sistemului electoral asupra numarului de partide

*Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems, Pippa Norris, International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol. 18, No. 3, Contrasting Political Institutions. Institutions politiques contrastées#. (Jul., 1997), pp. 297-312. Stable URL: <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0192-5121%28199707%2918%3A3%3C297%3ACESPMA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K>.*






FIGURE 2. *Electoral Systems by ENNP.*<sup>3</sup>

### Impactul sistemului electoral asupra participării la vot

*Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems, Pippa Norris, International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol. 18, No. 3, Contrasting Political Institutions. Institutions politiques contrastées#. (Jul., 1997), pp. 297-312. Stable URL:*<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0192-5121%28199707%2918%3A3%3C297%3ACESPMA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K>.




FIGURE 3. *Electoral Systems by Turnout.*<sup>3</sup>

**Electoral Systems and Democracy in Central Europe, 1990-1994**

**János Simon** *International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique*,  
Vol. 18, No. 4, Elections and Parliaments in Post-Communist East Central Europe.

*Electoral Systems and Democracy in Central Europe, 1990–1994*

**Appendix**

TABLE 1. *Electoral Systems in Central Europe.*

	Electoral systems		
	Proportional	Majoritarian	Mixed
Poland 1989	x		
Poland 1991		x	
Czechoslovakia 1990/1992	x		
Hungary 1990/1994			x
Albania 1991		x	
Albania 1992	x		
Bulgaria 1990			x
Bulgaria 1992	x		
Romania 1990/1992	x		

TABLE 2. *Albanian Parliamentary Elections.*

Parties	Votes	Seats	
	%	no.	%
<i>31 March and 7–14 April 1991 (240 seats)</i>			
Albanian Workers Party	56.1	169	70.4
Democratic Party	38.7	75	31.2
Omonia	0.7	5	2.0
National Veterans Committee	0.2	1	0.4
Republican Party	0.1	0	0
Agrarian Party	0.0	0	0
(All non-represented parties)	4.1	0	0)
<i>23–29 March 1992 (240 seats)</i>			
Democratic Party	62.0	92	65.7
Socialist Party	25.7	38	27.1
Social Democratic Party	4.3	7	5.0
Unity Party of Human Rights	2.9	2	1.4
Republican Party	3.1	1	0.7
(All non-represented parties)	1.7	0	0)

TABLE 3. *Bulgarian Parliamentary Elections.*

Parties	Votes	Seats	
	%	no.	%
<i>10–17 June 1990 (400 seats)</i>			
Bulgarian Socialist Party	45.5	211	52.7
Union of Democratic Forces	36.5	144	36.0
Movement for Rights and Freedoms	5.8	23	5.7
National Agrarian Union	7.7	16	4.0
Patriotic Workers Party	0.5	1	0.2
Social Democratic Party	0.4	1	0.2
Independents	0	4	1.0
(All non-represented parties)	3.6	0	0)
<i>13 October 1991 (240 seats)</i>			
Union of Democratic Forces	34.3	110	46
Bulgarian Socialist Party	33.1	106	44
Movement for Rights and Freedoms	7.5	24	10
Bulgarian Agrarian Union-United	3.8	0	0
Bulgarian Agrarian Union-N.Petkov	3.4	0	0
SDS-Center	3.2	0	0
SDS-Liberals	2.8	0	0
Kingdom of Bulgaria Confederation	1.8	0	0
Bulgarian Business Bloc	1.3	0	0
Bulgarian National Radical Party	1.3	0	0
(All non-represented parties)	24.9	0	0)

TABLE 5. *Hungarian Parliamentary Elections.*

Parties	Votes (%)	no.	Seats	
	1st round		%	
<i>25 March, 8 April 1990 Hungary (386 seats)</i>				
Hungarian Democratic Forum	24.7	165	42.7	
Alliance of Free Democrats	21.3	91	23.6	
Independent Smallholders Party	11.7	44	11.4	
Hungarian Socialist Party	10.8	33	8.5	
Alliance of Young Democrats	8.9	21	5.4	
Christian Democratic Peoples Party	6.4	21	5.4	
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	3.6	0	0	
Hungarian Social Democratic Party	3.5	0	0	
Agrarian Alliance	3.1	1	1	
Entrepreneurs Party	1.8	0	0	
Patriotic Electoral Coalition	1.8	0	0	
Candidates endorsed by various parties	3.5	4	1.0	
Independent candidates	–	6	1.0	
(All non-represented parties)	10.9	0	0)	
<i>8–29 May 1994 Hungary (386 seats)</i>				
Hungarian Socialist Party	32.9	209	54.1	
Alliance of Free Democrats	19.7	70	18.1	
Hungarian Democratic Forum	11.7	37	9.5	
Independent Smallholders Party	8.8	26	6.7	
Christian Democratic Peoples Party	7.0	22	5.7	
Alliance of Young Democrats	7.0	20	5.1	
Workers Party	3.1	0	0	
Republican Party	2.5	0	0	
Agrarian Alliance	2.1	0	0	
Hungarian Justice and Life Party	1.5	0	0	
Hungarian Social Democratic Party	0.9	0	0	
Entrepreneurs Party	0.6	0	0	
National Democratic Alliance	0.5	0	0	
Green Party of Hungary	0.1	0	0	
(All non-represented parties)	9.9	0	0)	

TABLE 7. *Romanian Parliamentary Elections.*

Parties	Votes	Seats	
	%	no.	%
<i>20 May 1990 (387 seats)</i>			
National Salvation Front	66.3	263	67.9
Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania	7.2	29	7.2
National Liberal Party	6.4	29	7.2
Ecological Movement of Romania	2.6	12	3.1
National Peasant Christian Dem.Party	2.5	12	3.1
Alliance for Romanian Unity	2.1	9	2.3
Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania	1.8	9	2.3
Romanian Ecological Party	1.6	8	1.3
Socialist Democratic Romanian Party	1.0	5	1.2
Social Democratic Romanian Party	0.5	2	0.5
Democratic Center Group	0.4	2	0.5
Other parties		7	0.2
Representatives designated by national minorities		9	2.3
<i>27 September 1992 (387 seats)</i>			
Democratic National Salvation Front	27.7	117	40.6
Democratic Convention of Romania	20.0	82	24.0
National Salvation Front	10.1	43	12.8
Party of Romanian National Unity	7.7	30	8.7
Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania	7.4	27	7.9
Greater Romania Party	3.8	16	4.6
Socialist Labour Party	3.0	13	3.8
Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania	2.9	0	0
National Liberal Party	2.5	0	0
Romanian Ecological Movement	2.3	0	0
Republican Party	1.7	0	0
Representatives designated by national minorities	0.9	0	0
(All non-represented parties)	18.9	0	0)

TABLE 6. *Polish Parliamentary Elections.*

Parties	Uncontested seats	Contested seats	
<i>4-18 June 1989 (460 seats)</i>			
Polish United Workers Party	173	0	
Unified Peasant Party	76	0	
Democratic Party	27	0	
Pax	10	0	
Christian and Social Union	8	0	
Union of Catholic Laymen	5	0	
Solidarity	–	161	
Parties	Votes %	Seats no.	%
<i>27 October 1991 (460 seats)</i>			
Democratic Union	12.3	62	13.2
Democratic Left Alliance	11.9	60	13.0
Catholic Electoral Action	8.7	49	10.6
Citizens Center Alliance	8.7	44	9.7
Polish Peasants' Union – Progr.A.	8.6	48	10.4
Confederation for an Independent Poland	7.5	46	10.2
Liberal Democratic Congress	7.4	37	8.2
Peasant Movement – People's Union	5.4	28	6.2
Solidarity Trade Union	5.0	27	6.0
Polish Party of Beer Lovers	3.2	16	3.5
Christian Democracy	2.3	5	1.1
Union of Real Politics	2.2	3	0.6
Solidarity of Work	2.0	4	0.8
Democratic Party	1.4	1	0.2
German Minority	1.1	7	1.5
Party of Christian Democrats	1.1	4	0.8
Party X	0.4	3	0.6
Democratic Social Movement	0.4	1	0.2
Peasants Electoral Alliance Piast	0.3	1	0.2
Movement for Silesian Autonomy	0.3	2	0.4
Cracow's Coalition of Supporters of President	0.2	1	0.2
Association of Pohele Residents	0.2	1	0.2
Polish Western Association	0.2	3	0.6
Other parties and independent candidates	0.7	6	0.2

**Transitional Electoral Systems in Post-Communist Eastern Europe**

John T. Ishiyama *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 112, No. 1. (Spring, 1997), pp. 95-115.

TABLE 1  
 Characteristics of the Last Competitive Interwar Eastern European Electoral Systems

Country	Year of last free election	System Type	Number of Seats in Legislature	Number of Constituencies	Average District Magnitude	Magnitude Range	Allocation Formula	Supplementary Seats?	Voter Choice?
Bulgaria	1931	List PR	273 (depended on voter turnout)	—	273	—	d'Hondt	No	No
Czechoslovakia	1935	List PR	300	12	25	depended on turnout	d'Hondt	No	No
Estonia	1932	List PR	100	11	9.9	5–20	d'Hondt	No	No
Latvia	1932	List PR	100	5	20	NA*	d'Hondt	No	No
Poland	1922	List PR	444	64	5.8	3–10	d'Hondt**	No	No

\* Unfortunately the data on the magnitude range for Latvia are currently unavailable.

\*\* Seventy-two seats reserved for parties that had nominated candidates in at least six constituencies.

Sources: J. Korbel, *Twentieth Century Czechoslovakia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); A. Polonsky, *Politics in Independent Poland: 1921–1939* (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1972); V. M. Dean, B. W. Diffie, M. W. Graham, and M. S. Wertheimer, *New Governments in Europe: The Trend Towards Dictatorship* (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1934); Malbone W. Graham, *New Governments of Eastern Europe* (New York: Henry Holt, 1924); C. Cook and J. Paxton, *European Political Facts 1918–1990* (New York: Facts on File, 1992).

TABLE 2  
 Characteristics of the Transitional Eastern European Electoral Systems

Country	Year of Election	System Type	Number of Seats in Legislature	Number of Constituencies	Average District Magnitude	Magnitude Range	Allocation Formula	Supplementary Seats?	Voter Choice?
Bulgaria (majority seats) (list seats)	1990	Mixed	200	200	1	—	majority	No	—
			200	28	7.14	3–26	d'Hondt with 4% threshold	No	No
Czechoslovakia	1990	List PR	150	12	12.5	depended on voter turnout	Hare quota/largest re-remainders with 5% threshold	No	Yes
Estonia	1990	Nonlist PR (STV)	101*	46	2.3	1–5	Droop Quota	No	Yes
Hungary (majority seats) (regional list)  (national compensation seats)	1990	Mixed	176	176	1	—	majority	No	No
			152	20	7.6	2–28	Hare quota/largest remainders		
			58	1	58	—	Droop quota		
Latvia	1990	Single Member Majority	201	201	1	—	Majority two ballots	No	—
Lithuania	1990	Single member/majority (45)	141	141	1	—	majority	No	—
Poland	1989	Limited Majority**	460	460	1	—	Majority two ballots	No	—
Romania	1990	List PR	387	41	9.4	—	Quota no threshold	No	—

## Modul 3. Compararea sistemelor de partide si a grupurilor de interese

### Partide politice

#### Definirea partidelor politice

- Organizatii care urmaresc sa isi plaseze reprezentati in pozitii publice
- Prin urmarirea interesului propriu, partidele sunt necesare democratiei moderne
  - Mecanisme de piata: interes propriu/putere
  - Necesita un sistem de partide care sa functioneze efectiv

#### Rolul partidelor politice intr-un regim democratic

- 1) Canal de comunicare:
  - implica oficiali ai statului si cetateni
  - *reprezinta o curea de transmisie pentru democratie*
- 2) Agenti de mobilizare
- 3) Recruteaza agenti pentru pozitii de conducere/ leadership
- 4) Agregate interese

#### Categorizarea Partidelor Politice

##### *Competitive v. Non-competitive*

In acest sens sunt relevante urmatoarele dimensiuni:

- Masura in care partidele respecta suprematia legii
- Particularizate v. partide tip catch-all
- Extinderea ideologica si marimea scopului urmarit
- Versiunile extreme nu au componenta ideologica
- Ierarhice v. Dezagregate
- Numarul si profunzimea factiunilor din interior
- Cele ierarhice de obicei au o disciplina de partid ridicata

##### *Natura interactiunilor dintre partide*

- Numarul de partide (absolut si efectiv)
- Pozitionarea ideologica a partidelor
  - Distanta ideologica
  - Dimensiuni relevante (economie, (des)centralizare)
- Stilul competitiei (centripetal vs. centrifugal)



Russell J. Dalton, "The History of Party Systems," in Dalton, *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Western Democracies*, 2nd ed. (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1996), pp. 149-164

## I. Old politics, cleavages and parties

**National Revolution spawned two kinds of social cleavage.**

1. The **center-periphery cleavage** pitted the dominant national culture against ethnic, linguistic, or religious minorities in the provinces and the peripheral sectors of society. It involved conflicts over values and cultural identities. Were Alsations to become Germans or French; was Scotland a separate nation or a region within Britain? The westward expansion of the United States during its history generated similar tensions between regional cultures.

2. The **church-state conflict** cast the centralizing, standardizing, and mobilizing forces of the national government against the traditional influence of the Catholic church.

**The Industrial Revolution** in the nineteenth century **also generated two new social cleavages.**


1. **land-industry cleavage** aligned the rural and agrarian interests against the economic concerns of the rising class of industrial entrepreneurs. The Ruhr industrialists challenged the power of the Prussian Junkers; the landed gentry of Britain and the United States were challenged by the barons of industry.

2. **owners and workers.** This cleavage furnished the basis of the Marxian class conflict between the working class and the middle class composed of business owners and the self-employed.

## II. New politics, cleavages and parties

**Party systems derived from the National and Industrial revolutions faced the issues of environmental protection, social equality, nuclear energy, sexual equality, and alternative lifestyles. Citizens demanded more opportunities for participation** in the decisions affecting their lives and pressed for a further democratization of society and politics.

**As a result, several new parties formed specifically to represent the new political perspectives.** The first wave included environmental parties, such as the green parties in Germany and France or Left-libertarian parties (Miiller-Rommel 1989; Kitschelt 1989). This stimulated a counter wave of New Right parties, such as the National Front in France or the Republikaner in Germany (Betz 1994; Ignazi 1992).



**Formation and Success of New Parties: A Cross-National Analysis**, Robert Harmel; John D. Robertson, *International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique*, Vol. 6, No. 4, New Political Parties. (1985), pp. 501-523.

**TABLE 1**  
**Sample of Explanatory Factors Suggested**  
**or Treated by Selected Authors**

Factors affecting new party formation		
Social	Political	Structural
New cleavages or issues (HR, 36-42; H, 2 and 8; T, 358-364; P, 25-26)	Behavior of existing parties (HR, 46-48; M-R, 74; P, 25) Mass commitment (attitude of voters toward new party) (HR, 48-50) Availability of effective leadership for new party (HR, 51-52) Ideological orientation (P, 23; JG, 164) Nature of competition in party systems (M-R, 72-73) Positions of trade unions (M-R, 72-73) Salience of new issues (M-R, 72-74)	Type of electoral system (HR, 37 and 43; M-R, 72-74) Electoral focus: presidential or parliamentary (HR, 37 and 44) Centralization of government (HR, 44-45) Freedom to organize (JG, 166)
Factors affecting new party success survival		
Many of the above social and political factors in addition to these internal party factors:		
(1) How party elite acts (HR, 38 and 52); (2) Strength of organizational base (HR, 52)		
NOTE: Hauss and Rayside, 1978; H: Hauss, 1982; T: Thomas, 1980; P: Pilat, 1980; M-R: Müller-Rommel, 1982; JG: Janda and Gillies, 1980; the numbers following initials are page numbers.		

**TABLE 3**  
**Hypotheses**

Social	H <sub>1</sub> :	Large countries	should produce a larger number of new parties and a higher level of new party success than small countries
	H <sub>2</sub> :	Plural societies	should produce a larger number of new parties and a higher level of new party success than non-plural societies
	H <sub>3</sub> :	Heterogeneous societies	should produce a larger number of new parties and a higher level of new party success than homogeneous societies
	H <sub>4</sub> :	Extreme sectionalism	should produce a larger number of new parties and a higher level of new party success than no sectionalism
	H <sub>5</sub> :	Higher inequality	should produce a larger number of new parties and a higher level of new party success than equality
	H <sub>6</sub> :	Societies with high post-materialism	should produce a larger number of new parties and a higher level of new party success than societies with low post-materialism
Political	H <sub>7</sub> :	Two party systems	should produce a larger number of new parties and a higher level of new party success than multi-party systems
	H <sub>8</sub> :	Party systems where few cleavage dimensions are currently addressed	should produce a larger number of new parties and a higher level of new party success than party systems where many dimensions are already addressed
Structural	H <sub>9</sub> :	Countries with easy ballot access	should produce a higher level of new party success than countries with difficult ballot access
	H <sub>10</sub> :	Proportional representation systems with multi-member districts	should produce a higher level of new party success than plurality or majority systems with single member districts
	H <sub>11</sub> :	Parliamentary systems	should produce a higher level of new party success than presidential systems
	H <sub>12</sub> :	Decentralized politics	should produce a higher level of new party success than centralized politics

**TABLE 4**  
**Data on Formation of New Parties, 1960-1980**

	All New Parties		Naturally Formed Only	
	N	(%)	N	(%)
<b>Circumstances of formation</b>				
by merger	29	12.4		
by split	85	36.5		
naturally	112	48.1		
by reorganization of former party	7	3.0		
<b>Purpose of formation</b>				
(a) to present "new issue" <sup>1</sup>	23	9.9	20	17.9
(b) to offer alternative on "old issue" <sup>2</sup>	112	48.1	44	39.3
(c) to offer other issue <sup>3</sup>	61	26.2	37	33.0
(b) and (c) above	13	5.6	10	8.9
(a) and (b) and (c) above	2	0.9	1	0.9
(d) practical political reasons <sup>4</sup>	22	9.4	0	0.0
<b>Year formed</b>				
1960-1964	27	11.6	19	17.0
1965-1969	51	21.9	15	13.4
1970-1974	78	33.5	33	29.5
1975-1980	77	33.0	45	40.2

**TABLE 5**  
**Data on Ideological Orientation of New Parties, 1960-1980**

	All New Parties		Naturally Formed Only	
	N	(%)	N	(%)
Communist	57	24.5	6	5.4
Non-communist left	38	16.4	18	16.1
Center	22	16.4	10	8.9
Right	40	17.2	23	20.5
Other	61	26.2	45	40.2
Other + Left	7	3.0	5	4.5
Other + Center	4	1.7	2	1.8
Other + Right	4	1.7	3	2.7

**TABLE 6**  
**New Party Success by Nature of Formation, All New Parties (in percentages)**

Value	Maximum Level of Success through 1980	Parties Formed by				New Issue	Parties Formed for		Practical Reasons
		All Parties	Merger	Split	Naturally		Old Issue	Other Issue	
0	0.0-1.0% of votes	64.8	55.2	60.0	71.4	69.6	63.4	65.6	59.1
1	1.01-4.99% of votes	2.1	0	3.5	.9	4.3	1.8	1.6	4.5
2	5.00-9.99% of votes	3.0	3.4	4.7	1.8	0	3.6	4.9	0
3	more than 10.0% of votes, but no seats	4.3	3.4	2.4	6.3	13.0	3.6	3.3	0
4	up to 10.0% of seats	18.5	20.7	21.2	16.1	13.0	20.5	18.0	22.7
5	more than 10.0% of seats	1.3	3.4	0	1.8	0	2.7	0	0
6	participation in cabinet	6.0	13.8	8.2	1.8	0	4.5	6.6	13.6
	Number of parties	233	29	85	112	23	112	61	22
	Mean value	1.37	2.00	1.54	1.07	.96	1.42	1.33	1.77
	Median value	.27	.41	.32	.20	.22	.29	.26	.35

**TABLE 7**  
**New Party Success by Ideological Orientation, All New Parties**

Value	Maximum Level of Success Through 1980	Ideological Orientation					
		Communist	Non-Communist Left	Center	Right	All Other	Ecology
0	0.0-1.0% of votes	78.9	66.7	45.5	57.5	70.5	76.9
1	1.01-4.99% of votes	7.9	0	0	2.5	1.6	0
2	5.00-9.99% of votes	5.3	1.8	0	2.5	3.3	0
3	more than 10.0% of votes, but no seats	0	1.8	0	10.0	6.6	7.7
4	up to 10.0% of seats	5.3	21.1	22.7	22.5	18.0	15.4
5	more than 10.0% of seats	0	1.8	4.5	2.5	0	0
6	participation in cabinet	2.6	7.0	27.3	2.5	0	0
	Number of parties	38	84	22	40	61	13
	Mean value	.55	1.44	2.77	1.55	1.00	.85
	Median value	.13	.25	.70	.37	.21	.15

**TABLE 9**  
Associations Between Number of New Parties and Societal, Political, and Structural Variables

Hypotheses	Independent Variable	Number of New Parties (All)	Number of New Parties (Natural)
1	Population	X	X
2	Pluralism	X	
3	Heterogeneity	X	X
4	Sectionalism	X	X
5	Inequality	*	*
6	Post-materialism/materialism		
7	Number of existing effective parties		
8	Number of effective dimensions in existing party system		
9	Ballot access		
10	Election system	*	*
11	Parliamentary/presidential		
12	Federalism		

**TABLE 12**  
New Party Success by Election System for Naturally Formed Parties Only\*

	Plurality or Majority	Proportional Representation
No new party has gained any seats in the national legislature	Australia	Austria
	France	Sweden
	New Zealand	Germany <sup>1</sup>
	United Kingdom	
	United States	
At least one new party has gained at least one seat in the national legislature	Canada	Belgium
		Denmark
		Finland
		Ireland
		Italy
		Luxembourg
		Netherlands
		Norway
		Switzerland

NOTE: Based only on the new parties formed from 1960 through 1980. This excludes parties formed even more recently, such as the Social Democrats of Britain.

TYPES OF PARTY SYSTEM\* , JEAN BLONDEL, From Peter Mair (ed.) *The West European Party System* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 302-310.

**TABLE 22.3.** The Ideological Spectrum of Parties in Western Democracies

	Comm.	Soc.	Lib/Rad.	Agr.	Christ.	Cons.
<b>Group 1</b>						
<b>Two-party systems</b>						
United States			L L			
New Zealand		L	c			L
Australia		L	c			L
United Kingdom		L	e			L
Austria		L	e?		I.	
<b>Group 2</b>						
<b>Two-and-a-half-party systems</b>						
Germany		L	s		L	
Belgium		L	s		L	
Luxemburg		L	s		L	
Canada		s	L			L
Eire		s	L			L
<b>Group 3</b>						
<b>Multiparty systems with one dominant party</b>						
Denmark		L	s/m	s		s/m
Norway		L	s	s	s	s/m
Sweden		L	s/m	s		s/m
Iceland	s/m	s/m	M			L
Italy	m	s	s		L	s
<b>Group 4</b>						
<b>Multiparty systems without dominant party</b>						
Netherlands		M	s		M	s
Switzerland		M	M		M	s
France	M	s/m	s		s	M
Finland	M	M	s	M		s

L = large party (about 40 per cent)  
M = medium-sized party (somewhat over 20 per cent)  
s/m = small to medium-sized party (about 15 per cent)  
s = small party (about 10 per cent or even less)  
c = very small party (only mentioned in relation to two-party systems)

TABLE 22.2. Average Strength of the Two Major Parties in Two- and Two-and-a-half Party Systems (percentage votes cast)

<b>Two-party systems</b>	
	<u>Difference</u>
United States	49-50=1
New Zealand	48-47=1
Australia United	47-46=1
Kingdom	45-47=2
Austria	46-43=3
Mean disparity between the two major parties= <b>1.6</b>	
<b>Two-and-a-half party systems</b>	
Germany	45-35=10
Canada	36-43=7
Belgium	43-35=8
Eire	46-29=17
Mean disparity between the two major parties= <b>10.5</b>	

**Party Systems and Political System Performance: Voting Participation, Government Stability and Mass Violence in Contemporary Democracies**, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 75, No. 4. (Dec., 1981), pp. 861-879.

<b>Majority-Producing</b>	<b>YES</b>	<b>Aggregative Majority A.</b>	<b>Responsible Majority B.</b>
	<b>NO</b>	<b>Fractionalized C.</b>	<b>Representational D.</b>
		<b>NO</b>	<b>YES</b>
<b>Strong and Distinct Linkages between Different Parties and Social Groups</b>			

Source: Formulated by the author.

Figure 1. A Typology of Candidates for "Strong" Non-Extremist Party Systems


**Table 1. A Classification of Party Systems in 1965-75: The Nonextremist Party Systems**

Majority-Producing	Yes—in half of elections	<i>Aggregative Majority</i> Canada (63) Costa Rica (58) Ireland (61) Jamaica (45) Philippines (49) Turkey (63) Uruguay (61) United States (48)	<i>Responsible Majority</i> Australia (61) Austria (54) Ceylon (67) New Zealand (49) United Kingdom (53)
	No—less than half of elections	<i>Fractionalized</i> Lebanon (95) Venezuela (72)	<i>Representational</i> West Germany (57) Netherlands (84) Norway (72) Sweden (69) Switzerland (81)
		NO	YES
Strong Linkages Between Groups and Parties			

**Table 2. A Classification of Party Systems in 1965-75: The Extremist Party Systems**

Majority-Producing	Yes—in half of more of elections	India (60) Japan (61)	
	No—in less than half of the elections	Chile <sup>a</sup> (73)	Belgium (76) Denmark (79) Finland (81) France (71) Italy (78)
		NO	YES
Strong Linkages Between Groups and Parties			

Figure 4.1: Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (ENPP) by electoral family



Note: The Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (ENPP) is calculated following the method of Laakso and Taagepera (1979). For details of the elections see Table 2.1.

Figure 4.2: Proportionality by electoral family

## Grupuri de Interese

Grupurile de interese desemneaza:

- Un subset al societatii civile
- Organizatii care articuleaza *interese* si cereri ale unor grupuri particulare, adesea, cu scopul de a influenta politicile publice

## Rolul Grupurilor de Interese intr-un regim Democratic

- Articuleaza interese/ Advocacy
  - Pun in evidenta care este miza unor probleme
  - Desemneaza reprezentanti
  - Determina optini cu privire la politicile publice (sau absenta optiunilor)
- Mobilizeaza cetatenii sa participe la viata publica / politica
- Furnizeaza informatii pentru cei care elaboreaza politici publice
- Genereaza “capital social ”
  - Construiesc canale de reciprocitate si incredere
  - Genereaza resurse pentru cetateni: incredere proprie si abilitati



## Clasificarea Sistemelor de Grupuri de Interese

### *Sisteme Pluraliste*

- Mai multe grupuri competitioneaza in jurul unei probleme
- Membership-ul este voluntar
- Structura organizationala destul de superficiala
- Grupurile se adreseaza institutiile statului dar numai rar devin parte a acestor institutii
- Exemple: U.S., U.K., Japonia

### *Corporatism Democratic*

- Organizatii mari, umbrela, care domina discutia /dezbaterea cu privire la o problema (de obicei doua mari grupuri in jurul unei probleme)
- Presiune mare pentru ca indivizii sa devina membrii
- Organizarea este centralizata si ierarhica
- Grupurile penetreaza in structura institutiilor statului
- Exemple: Germania, Norvegia, Suedia

### *Corporatism Controlat (de Stat)*

- Cate un singur grup pentru fiecare arie de politici publice — supravegheat de guvern
- Membership-ul este obligatoriu
- Foarte centralizat si ierarhic
- Grupurile sunt controlate de stat
  - Adesea utilizate pentru implementarea unor politici
  - Adesea consultate in procesul de elaborare a politicilor publice
- Exemple: China, Cuba, Rusia

## Diferite Sisteme de Grupuri de Interese si Democratie

- Istoric sistemele de grupuri de interese au aparut in interactiune cu structura de clivaje sociale
  - Extinerea Ipotezei Inghetarii Clivajelor (Freezing Hypothesis) (Lipset, Seymour M. and Stein Rokkan (1967). 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction' in Seymour M Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.) Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives. London & New York: The Free Press)
  - Teoria puterii clasei muncitoare (Stephens, John D. (1986) The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism, University of Illinois Press )
- Masura in care statul este unitar sau nu are importanta in formarea sistemului de grupuri de interese
- Masura in care grupurile se alinieaza partidelor politice are importanta in formarea sistemului de grupuri de interese

## Modul 4. Compararea tipurilor de cultura politica

Cultura politica reprezinta ansamblul de orientari si atitudini pe care cetatenii le au in raport cu sistemul politic (actorii acestuia, procesele si evenimentele politice, etc) si cu privire la rolul lor in raport cu sistemul politic. In lucrarea "The Civic Culture; Political Culture and Attitudes in 5 Nations", Almond si Verba discuta trei forme de cultura politica, dupa cum urmeaza (Almond, G., & Verba, S. 1963. The Civic Culture; Political Culture and Attitudes in 5 Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)

- ✓ Cultura politica participativa: cetatenii recunosc elemente ale sistemului politic sunt orientati activ atat catre input-ul cat si catre output-ul sistemului politic.
- ✓ Cultura politica dependenta: cetatenii recunosc elementele sistemului politic dar sunt orientati numai catre output-ul sistemului, neincercand sa il influenteze.
- ✓ Cultura politica parohiala: indivizii ignora sistemul politic (actorii si procesele politice) si se ghideaza dupa alte reguli interne/specifice grupului din care fac parte.

In acest context, cultura civica reprezinta un mix al celor trei forme prezentate anterior, care sustine functionarea democratiei.

Ipoteza: cultura politica dominanta explica tipul de regim politic

Inglehart analizeaza variata intre tari a sprijinului pentru democratie (Inglehart, R. 2003. How Solid Is Mass Support for Democracy: And How Can We Measure It?, *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 1. pp. 51-57)

Rezultate:

- ✓ in 77 tari exista puternic sprijin pentru democratie:
  - Rusia = 62%; Pakistan = 68%
  - Toate celelalte 77 au valori de peste 80%
  - Sprijinul pentru democratie este puternic in statele islamice

Inglehart evalueaza si sprijinul pentru forme de guvernare non-democratice

- ✓ Rezultatele din cele 77 tari variaza
- ✓ Vietnam = 99%
- ✓ Azerbaijan, Egipt si Grecia < 10%
- ✓ US este cu putin sub 30%

Cultura Politica si Democratie

*Index-ul Democratie/Autocratie (masoara)*

- Favorizarea democratiei ca si sistem politic
- Democratia este un regim mai bun decat altele?

- Favorizarea “expertilor”
- Favorizeaza unui lider puternic

*Scoruri/masuri ale Supravietuirii/Auto-Afirmarii*

- Incredere sociala
- Satisfactia cu modul de viata
- Toleranta
- Participare
- Valori materialiste/post-materialiste

*Recomandare bibliografica suplimentara:* Inglehart, R. (1990). *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press

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Welzel, C. & Inglehart, R. 2008. “The Role of Ordinary People in Democratization”, *Journal of Democracy* 2008 (January) 19, 1: 126-140

- Aprofundeaza dezbaterile cu privire la atitudinile care stau la baza sprijinului pentru un tip de regim politic
- Argumenteaza rolul “culturii politice definite prin Indexul Supravietuirii/Auto-Afirmarii
- Democratia este “castigata” si sustinuta atunci cand grupuri largi din populatie considera “supravietuirea” ca fiind ceva garantat
- Dezvoltarea economica contribuie la sprijinirea democratiei, dar este nevoie de o “credinta populara” in nevoia dezvoltarii umane in paralel cu cea economica


*Recomandare bibliografica suplimentara:* Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. 2005. *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. Cambridge University Press.

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Ronald Inglehart; Pippa Norris, The True Clash of Civilizations, *Foreign Policy*, No. 135. (Mar. - Apr., 2003), pp. 62-70.

# The Cultural Divide

*Approval of Political and Social Values in Western and Muslim Societies*



## Variatii intre Regimurile Nedemocratice

- Irak-ul sub Saddam Hussein: autocratie (sultanism)
- Pakistan sub Musharraf: dictatura militare
- Argentina (1966-73): autoritarism birocratic
- China: dictatura unui singur partid
- Afghanistan in perioada Talibanilor: teocratie

## Intrebari de autoevaluare :

1. Prezentati pe scurt doua abordari comparative a sistemelor politice.
2. Prezentati pe scurt doua abordari comparative a sistemelor electorale.
3. Prezentati pe scurt doua abordari comparative a sistemelor de partide.
4. Prezentati pe scurt doua abordari comparative ale tipurilor de cultura politica.